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A commentary on
A crisis in comparative psychology: where have all the undergraduates gone?
by Abramson, C. I. (2015). Front. Psychol. 6:1500. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01500
In the Twentieth Century animal behavior was studied by European ethologists and American
behaviorists. By fusing these approaches, comparative psychology became the framework for
addressing animal behavior issues and understanding psychological functions shared by a
variety of species. Relying on interspecies comparisons, comparative psychology complements
developmental psychology and differential psychology, which are focused on intraspecies
comparisons. All are better conceived as integrable perspectives, we think, rather than disciplines.
Abramson (2015) describes an academic crisis that is emphasized (if not induced) by his personal
way of contrasting behavior vs. cognition, grounded on the identification of psychology with the
study of behavior and the assumption that the study of cognition is based on “suppositions”
and “beliefs” (in Abramson’s words). We disagree with both grounding propositions. Behavior
of organisms is studied by several disciplines. What makes psychology special is the application
of the scientific method to the study of mental phenomena (as they appear to individuals), as
well as mental constructs (as elements of a theory). Cognitivism produced models and evidence to
explain cardinal phenomena missed by radical behaviorism. For instance, in classical conditioning
the conditioned stimuli must be predictive of the unconditioned stimuli for conditioning to occur
(Rescorla, 1988); namely, the mere contiguity between stimuli is not sufficient. Furthermore, the
study of behavior in controlled settings cannot be the defining feature of comparative psychology
only, given that it is shared with other disciplines (behavioral economics, microsociology,
behavioral neuroscience).
Abramson seems to underestimate the need for psychology—to hold the promise embodied in
its name—to take behaviors (of human and nonhuman animals in their natural environments or in
constrained settings, of brain areas, of single neurons) as observables that carry information about
its explananda, which in the words of James (1890, Preface) are “thoughts and feelings.” Cognition
and emotion are the indispensable objects of psychological research, to be studied through the
analysis and comparison of behaviors and explained, as regards proximate causes, by relevant neural
mechanisms. Reference to functions provides animal behaviors and brain activations withmeaning,
as expected by most people including undergraduates.
However, Abramson’s dissatisfaction does not match the point of view reflected in a recent
report of the Comparative Cognition Society (Weisman et al., 2015), the articulation of APA, and
authoritative evaluations of current comparative biology (Bateson, 2012). This point of view sees
the future of behavioral sciences in the integration with other disciplines.
Abramson’s pessimism might be the consequence of the dominance of neural explanations
(referring to proximate causes) over biological explanations (referring to the phylogenesis and
ontogenesis of cognition and emotion). We are convinced that a comparative perspective on
functions and mechanisms (not behaviors) can effectively balance neuroscience, like in the
following conclusion on visual cognition: “whether an animal is using a collothalamic- (birds) or
lemnothalamic-dominant (mammals) visual system, they may operate using similar computational
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and processing principles because of the structure of the visual
world” (Qadri and Cook, 2015). Significantly, this conclusion
comes from a laboratory that approaches questions from the
comparative cognition perspective and looks beyond neural
differences to identify the role of environmental constraints
in shaping a function. Even when only differences and no
similarities are available (a limiting case in the comparative
arena) still a Gedankenexperiment on how the same function
might appear in another animal, in a different way, can provide
an insight about its nature.
The work by O’Keefe and M.-B. and E. Moser acknowledged
with the Nobel Prize in 2014 helped in deepening the
understanding of the mechanism for spatial navigation (O’Keefe,
1971; Hafting et al., 2005). However, such physiological studies
resolve both scientific and philosophical questions only when
integrated with investigations on the utility and the development
of the mechanism (Wills et al., 2010; Bjerknes et al., 2014), its
evolution (Bingman and Sharp, 2006; Yartsev et al., 2011) and the
nature/nurture related aspects (Dehaene et al., 2006; Chiandetti
et al., 2015). Furthermore, when supported by computational
models, the research can profit of simulations that sometimes
even anticipate evidence coming from real organisms (Burgess
et al., 2000; Urdapilleta et al., 2015).
Integration of research efforts converging on spatial
navigation represents a successful example of the application
of Tinbergen’s fruitful warning. In his seminal work (1963)
Tinbergen suggested that true understanding of complex
functions requires an integrated approach within which—we
believe—the comparative psychology perspective can link
apparently distant fields (Tinbergen, 1963).
Within most academic institutions comparative psychology
will better act as one of the fundamental perspectives
than presenting itself as a leading discipline in a dedicated
undergraduate program. Undergraduates enrolled in several
programs—including psychology and biology, of course—should
be exposed to the comparative perspective to develop an
integrated understanding of mind-brain systems.
Tinbergen’s warning should be taken more broadly into
account (Bateson and Laland, 2013) and should motivate the
convergence of different areas of expertise. Heterogeneous teams
composed of people with different backgrounds are probably the
most fecund, especially with the rate of change in technological
innovations that need to be creatively adapted to the study of
minds/brains of disparate species. Diversity fosters knowledge.
As ethology and behaviorism molded together to support
a more exhaustive and controlled study of animal behavior,
comparative psychology should complement other perspectives
and intersect various levels of analysis (neural, genetic, ecological,
evolutionary) to answer all Tinbergen’s questions. The full
understanding of cognition and emotion will take place in a
nameless neutral field, fed by specialized disciplines but a step
away from them.
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